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Introduction
Patents aim to protect and promote innovation by granting innovators exclusive rights to commercially exploit their inventions for a limited period of time. With such exclusive rights, a patent holder is entitled to damage payments if another party infringes on his patent without the patent holder's authorization or license. Patent holders are also entitled to seek an injunction against the alleged infringer, preventing further acts of infringement. 1 However, for standard essential patents (SEPs), the availability of injunctive relief has been a contentious issue in high-tech industries where interoperability among various devices makes standards indispensable. In particular, one central policy question is whether the right to pursue injunctive relief should be extended to SEP owners who have made a commitment to license their essential patents on fair, reasonable and nondiscriminatory (FRAND) terms.
Views on this issue vary widely. One camp argues for no further restrictions on injunctions for SEPs than for non-SEP patents. In their view, the existing balancing test enunciated in eBay v. MercExchange is ‡exible enough to handle SEP cases, and thus a categorical treatment of SEPs is not justi…ed (Denicolo et al., 2008; Wellford and McCutchen, 2012 ). An alternative view indicates that SEP owners should not be entitled to injunctive relief, as they had committed to FRAND as a condition to be included in the relevant standard (Lemley and Shapiro, 2007) . In between, there is a wide spectrum of views concerning the extent to which the availability of injunctions should be constrained.
To address this issue, I develop a stylized model of a court-imposed dispute resolution mechanism in the context of standard essential patents (SEPs) with FRAND commitments.
In particular, I analyze the e¤ects of injunctions and potential court-imposed FRAND rates on negotiated royalty rates. The basic premise of this paper is that the negotiated royalty rate of a FRAND-encumbered SEP depends on both the framework in which the FRAND rate would be determined in the case of disputes and the availability of injunctive relief. In other words, the merits of the availability of injunctive relief cannot be assessed in isolation of the procedure and dispute settlement mechanisms in place to resolve any disputes that may arise between the SEP-holders and potential licensees concerning FRAND terms. I
show that the SEP-holders' ability to hold-up is mitigated by the prospect of the courtimposed license terms, but is not completely eliminated. I discuss possible mechanisms to limit the residual hold-up power of the SEP-holders.
As products become more complex and sophisticated, they tend to encompass numerous complementary technologies, which brings to the forefront the issue of SEPs. In an increasingly networked environment, interoperability among various devices also plays an important role, which makes standards indispensable for many technological areas such as computers and telecommunications. Industry standards promote competition by ensuring compatibility and interoperability among products from di¤erent vendors. Standardization can be achieved in di¤erent ways. Sometimes it is an outcome of a decentralized market process in which a particular product is widely accepted as a "de facto" standard as more consumers gravitate towards it (e.g., Microsoft Windows). Alternatively, a government can mandate particular technical speci…cations as "de jure' standards (e.g., High De…nition TV). In the majority of cases, however, the adoption of an industry standard is a result of negotiations by relevant stakeholders (such as vendors, engineers, and consumer groups) in a standard setting organization (SSO).
One potential issue with industry standards set by SSOs is that they may entail technologies covered by patents. In particular, there have been concerns that a patent included in a standard may have signi…cant ex post market power. Before an industry standard is determined, there can be competing alternative technologies. However, once a standard has been chosen and industry participants have made investments speci…c to the chosen standard, alternative technologies become less attractive and may not be in a position to constrain the market power of the standard-essential patents. To safeguard against these potential hold-up incentives by the owners of SEPs, most SSOs require the owners of SEPs (i) to disclose their IP rights prior to the adoption of a standard, and (ii) to commit to license their essential patents on FRAND terms.
Despite the best e¤orts by SSOs to mitigate the ex post hold-up incentives with ex ante disclosure and FRAND commitments by SEP owners, it has proven di¢ cult for an SSO to formulate and implement e¤ective rules, as evidenced by increasing litigation concerning SEPs. This problem has been particularly acute with regard to FRAND commitments.
One recent example is a dispute between Apple and Motorola (recently acquired by Google) concerning the terms of a license agreement on Motorola Mobility's patents essential to the H.264 (video codec) and IEEE 802.11 (WiFi) industry standards. Motorola insists that its 2.25% royalty demand is in line with its FRAND licensing obligations whereas Apple disputes that it is excessive. 2 As illustrated by the dispute between Apple and Motorola, one main reason for the prevalence of disputes concerning FRAND terms is in the ambiguity of what "reasonable" means. 3 Di¤erent interpretations of a reasonable royalty rate for di¤erent parties can lead to failed licensing negotiations, which results in litigation between SEP owners and a party that produces a product conforming to the industry standard. 4 In analyzing the negotiation and litigation incentives of SEP owners, it is important to understand that a crucial factor in the determination of the royalty rate are the remedies available to the SEP owners when potential infringement on their patents takes place. The reason is that the negotiation between an SEP owner and an alleged infringer takes place in the shadow of litigation and the damage rule applied to patent infringement. In particular, the threat of an injunction bestows a strong bargaining position to the patent owners in licensing negotiations, as demonstrated by the patent infringement case between NTP, Inc.
and Research in Motion (RIM). As articulated in an FTC report, "the patentee can use the threat of an injunction to obtain royalties covering not only the value of its invention compared to alternatives, but also a portion of the costs that the infringer would incur if it were enjoined and had to switch." 5 This possibility of overcompensation to the patentee based on hold-up value is especially acute for SEPs that constitute only a limited number of features in the infringing product (Shapiro, 2010) . In this regard, one important question to address is whether the SEP owners are entitled to injunctive relief against implementation of the standard when they have made FRAND commitments.
To answer the question of whether and under what circumstances injunctive relief should be available to the owners of SEPs, it is essential to discuss the framework that determines 2 Apple v. Motorola (No. 1:11-cv-08540 ), N.D. IL., June 22, 2012. 3 According to Robert McDowell, former FCC Commissioner, "reasonable" is not only a subjective term but "perhaps the most litigated word in American history." (Wall Street Journal, April 26-27, 2014). 4 See Carlton and Shampine (2013) for a discussion of how the "non-discriminatory" component of FRAND can mitigate the hold-up problem when the "reasonable" principle fails to do so. 5 Of course, the two scenarios discussed above are both extreme, and in reality the court will determine the FRAND rate and appropriate damage payments in the case of disputes, and bargaining will take place in the shadow of such expected FRAND rate determination. It is essential to discuss the e¤ects of injunctive relief in conjunction with the framework that determines FRAND rates in the event of disputes.
I thus present a stylized model of a court which grants injunctions when the court …nds that an SEP owner has o¤ered a FRAND rate, but the implementer has refused to accept it. In this framework, the implementer has legal recourse to rely on a court-determined FRAND rate if the SEP owner's demand is excessive. This mechanism provides the implementer a measure of protection against the SEP-holder's ability to hold-up. Nonetheless, uncertainty associated with the court-determined FRAND rate and potential injunction threats tip the balance of bargaining power towards the SEP-owner, which leads to an elevated license rate that overcompensates the SEP-owner. I show that how a modi…ed mechanism in which injunction is issued with "leniency" can restore the proper balance between the implementer and the SEP-owner. In particular, the analysis suggests that the court should be more lenient towards the implementer and more strict in imposing injunctions as a remedy when innovation is incremental and the court is less able to assess the FRAND rate precisely.
Ratli¤ and Rubinfeld (2013) develop a related model, but with a di¤erent conclusion.
They model a dispute between a SEP owner and an implementer of the standard over the licensee fee and argue that an injunction threat does not necessarily lead to hold-up because the implementer has the option to accept licensee terms that are determined by a court and thus avoid injunction. In other words, an injunction threat kicks in only when the implementer refuses to accept the court-determined licensing terms. Thus, the initial negotiation between the SEP owner and the implementer does not arise in the shadow of an injunction threat even if it is available, but in the shadow of the expected courtdetermined FRAND rate. One crucial consequence of the Ratli¤ and Rubinfeld timing assumption is that the implementer is given an unfair advantage in the royalty negotiation;
the implementer has nothing to lose by refusing the initial o¤er by the SEP-holder, because the implementer always has the option to accept the initial o¤er once it is certi…ed to be FRAND while the implementer gains in the other case where it is found not to be FRAND.
Langus, Lipatov, and Neven (2013) also relates to this paper. They develop a model 8 See Cotter (2013) for an overview.
of court-granted injunctions to analyze the e¤ects of injunctions on royalty negotiations for SEPs. As in my model, they assume that courts grant injunctions only when they believe that the prospective licensee is unwilling to license SEPs at the rate which the courts believe to be FRAND. However, they assume that the licensee is given a second chance to make an o¤er once its initial o¤er is found to not be FRAND. As a result, they …nd that "reverse hold-up" can arise in equilibrium in contrast to the conventional wisdom and the results derived in this paper.
Ganglmair, Froeb, and Werden (2012) For simplicity and to focus on the hold-up issue, I assume that the SEP owner and the implementer are in a vertical relationship and do not directly compete. For instance, the SEP owner is a pure research …rm that is not engaged in any production of devices that implement the standard. Thus, I do not address the case where the injunction threat can be cancelled out due to both parties'need to cross-license and ensure reciprocal access to each other's patent portfolios. It also allows me to abstract from foreclosure incentives in the downstream market.
SEPs are patents which have been declared to be essential to the implementation of a standard by an SSO. By de…nition, they will be very di¢ cult to design around, if not impossible. Otherwise, they would not be deemed essential to begin with. 10 However, we need to distinguish ex ante vs. ex post essentiality. Prior to the adoption of a particular standard, there may have been multiple competing technologies that would have been capable of performing similar functionalities as the one actually included in the standard. Thus, prior to the selection of a particular standard, no technology or patents running on it may be essential. 11 Once a particular standard has been selected and universally adopted by industry participants and the market, however, it would be economically infeasible to switch to another technology; this makes certain patents ex post essential in the implementation of the standard, which can confer a signi…cant bargaining power to SEP owners. 12 There is a widespread consensus among economists and legal scholars that SEP owners should be entitled to royalty rates based on the ex ante value of their technologies, not based on ex post bargaining power that arises from the ability to impose injunctions. This emerging consensus view is best described by the FTC:
High switching costs combined with the threat of an exclusion order could allow a patentee to obtain unreasonable licensing terms despite its RAND commitment, not because its invention is valuable, but because implementers are locked in to practicing the standard. The resulting imbalance between the value of patented technology and the rewards for innovation may be especially acute where the exclusion order is based on a patent covering a small component of a complex multicomponent product. In these ways, the threat of an exclusion order may allow the holder of a RAND-encumbered SEP to realize royalty rates that re ‡ect patent hold-up, rather than the value of the patent relative to alternatives, which could raise prices to consumers while undermining the standard setting process. 13 To illustrate this point, I …rst consider a benchmark case in which the royalty rates of SEPs are determined as part of ex ante competition to be included in the standard.
Benchmark Case of Ex Ante Competition
There are two competing substitute technologies, A and B, which can be potentially in- No. 337-TA-745, available at www.ftc.gov/os/2012/06/1206ftcwirelesscom.pdf Betrand type price competition implies that technology A will be chosen at the royalty rate of in equilibrium. In this idealistic setting, the royalty rate of standard-essential patents A re ‡ects the ex ante value of its superiority over the next best alternative available, which is its true economic value. Therefore, re ‡ects the true value of technology A over the next best available one. 1 4 Mulligan and Lee (2012) estimate that "it would require roughly 2 million patent attorneys, working full-time, to compare every …rm's products with every patent issued in a given year" to avoid accidental infringement. See Choi and Gerlach (2013) for an economic analysis of patent portfolios. 1 5 According to Drummond (2001) , Senior Vice President and Chief Legal O¢ cer of Google, a smartphone may contain as many as 250,000 patent claims.
Ex Post Hold-Up
If, however, the licensing negotiation takes place after the downstream …rm has sunk its investment, the threat of injunction by the SEP owner enables him to extract more than the economic value of the technology. We assume Nash bargaining between the SEP owner and the downstream …rm with the total surplus split between the two equally. This implies that the ex post licensing fee will be negotiated at =2: To re ‡ect the situation in which the patent at stake covers only a minor part of the multi-component product, I assume =2 > : The di¤erence between the ex post negotiated licensing fee and ex ante value re ‡ects the SEP owner's hold-up value H = =2 > 0: We expect that the downstream product commands a higher margin as the downstream …rm invests more to develop the product and produces a more sophisticated product that includes other features. With ex post bargaining, the more pro…table the product becomes, the more is extracted by the SEP owner as the hold-up value H increases. This obviously has a chilling e¤ect on downstream …rms'investment incentives and may ultimately undermine the successful implementation of standards.
FRAND Commitments as a Solution to Ex Post Hold-Up
In response to this potential hold-up problem, standard setting organizations often require that participants in the standardization process disclose any patents that are relevant to the standard and commit to license SEPs on FRAND terms. For instance, the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI), which is o¢ cially recognized by the
European Union as a European Standards Organization and produces globally-applicable standards for Information and Communications Technologies (ICT), stipulates:
When an ESSENTIAL IPR relating to a particular STANDARD or TECH-NICAL SPECIFICATION is brought to the attention of ETSI, the DirectorGeneral of ETSI shall immediately request the owner to give within three months an irrevocable undertaking in writing that it is prepared to grant irrevocable licences on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory ("FRAND") terms and conditions... 16 However, it does not provide any speci…c royalty rate for a FRAND license, which is the case for most SSOs. In addition, the de…nition of FRAND is vague and elusive to pin down, as explained below.
Determination of FRAND Terms
The main source of disputes arises from the meaning of FRAND as it can be interpreted in widely di¤erent ways. Obviously, what is "fair and reasonable" can be very di¢ cult to de…ne. The "non-discriminatory" component of FRAND at …rst may seem to be noncontroversial and easy to interpret. However, even this component of FRAND can be problematic. For instance, is a uniform royalty rate of 5% to everyone on the price of the product that contains the technology non-discriminatory? It may be considered as nondiscriminatory because everyone pays a 5% royalty, but the actual royalty payments can di¤er across licensees depending on the value of the products even though the percentage rate may be the same. To give an example, suppose that the same UMTS technology is incorporated in a simple phone sold at $50 and in a smartphone sold at $500. With a 5% royalty rate, the simple phone manufacturer will pay a royalty payment of $2.5 whereas the smartphone manufacturer will pay $25 for each phone sold. Is this contract nondiscriminatory? The emerging consensus on this seems to be that "similarly situated"
licensees should pay similar amounts, leaving the possibility of charging di¤erent prices for very di¤erent devices. Nonetheless, what constitutes similarity can still be subject to di¤erent interpretations even if this principle is agreed upon. 17 The "reasonable" component of FRAND is a much more di¢ cult term to de…ne and If they agree on a mutually acceptable rate, the game ends.
Stage 2 (FRAND Determination by Court): If the two parties cannot agree on a licensing fee, then the court will determine if the o¤er made by the SEP owner (but rejected by the implementer) r o is FRAND. There are two cases to consider. 18 (1) If r o is deemed to be FRAND by the court, the SEP-holder has ful…lled its FRAND obligation and is entitled to injunctive relief, as is the case for any other IP holders.
(2) If the court …nds r o to not be FRAND, it will determine an appropriate FRAND rate e r.
Stage 3.
(1) If r o is deemed to be FRAND and an injunction is ordered in Stage 2, the implementer either leaves the market or can further negotiate with the SEP-holder in the shadow of an injunction threat.
(2) If the court imposes a FRAND rate e r, the implementer either accepts the FRAND rate or leaves the market. In particular, they assume that when the initial o¤er by the SEP-holder is certi…ed to be FRAND by the court, the implementer has an option to accept the initial o¤er r o , and injunction can be invoked only when the implementer refuses to accept the FRAND rate.
This ability to rely on the initial o¤er or the court-imposed FRAND rate as a last resort leads them to conclude that injunction threats for FRAND-encumbered SEPs do not lead to hold-up. The problem with the Ratli¤ and Rubinfeld timing is that the implementer has nothing to lose by refusing the initial o¤er by the SEP-holder, because the implementer always has the option to accept the initial o¤er once it is certi…ed to be FRAND while the implementer gains in the other case where it is found not to be FRAND.
In contrast, I assume that once the initial o¤er is certi…ed to be FRAND, the SEPholder is entitled to injunctive relief because he has ful…lled his FRAND pledge, and further negotiation takes place under an injunctive threat, which provides incentives for the implementers to accept FRAND o¤ers when they are initially o¤ered. This is consistent with the prevailing court procedure. In other words, the court does not issue an injunction order prior to resolution of the dispute over the FRAND rate in the court. The court imposes injunction only when it …nds that the initial o¤er made by the SEP owner is FRAND and the infringer refused to accept the contract. 19 One remark on the dispute resolution procedure is in order. I assume that the court procedure is asymmetric in the sense that the court imposes a FRAND rate on the implementer only when the initial o¤er by the SEP-holder is excessive compare to the FRAND rate. When the initial o¤er is considered to be below the court-inferred FRAND rate, the court does not impose its inferred FRAND rate; the court rather issues an injunction and let the SEP-holder and the implementer bargain over the royalty rate in the shadow of injunctive relief. This procedure can be rationalized if we take into account the fact that the determination of a FRAND rate is time-consuming and costly. Thus, the court adopts a two-step procedure. First, it determines whether the initial royalty rate o¤ered by the SEP-holder falls within a reasonable range. 20 If it is, the court o¤ers injunctive relief to the SEP-holder and let the private parties determine the exact rate. However, if the initial o¤er is considered out of the reasonable range in the …rst step, the resolution of the dispute requires a further court intervention. In this case, the court engages in the second step of specifying a FRAND rate. This two-step procedure not only minimizes the court's involvement and costs, but also respects the SEP-holder's property rights as the court would prefer the private parties to work things out. 21 
The Irrelevance of Injunctions with the Perfect Court
For FRAND-encumbered SEPs, it needs to be determined whether the SEP owner has o¤ered a FRAND contract before any injunctive relief can be issued. The determination of FRAND is prerequisite, and injunctive relief is invoked only when the alleged infringer refuses to pay the FRAND o¤er made by the SEP owner or the court-determined FRAND o¤er. If the court is perfect in that it is able to set the FRAND rate at the ex ante value of the SEP, then whether injunctive relief is available is irrelevant and there is no concern with the potential hold-up problem because the implementers of the standard can always rely on the court ex post if the SEP owner makes an unreasonable demand beyond its ex ante value.
In reality, however, the court is imperfect and it would be prohibitively expensive for a judge to come up with a precise estimate of the ex ante value of the disputed SEPs.
In this case, the implementer cannot completely rely on the court when the SEP owner demands a royalty rate above the ex ante value because there is a possibility that the court overestimates the ex ante value and determines the SEP owner's demands to be FRAND.
Nonetheless, I assume that the court never …nds the FRAND rate to be above the maximum royalty rate the SEP owner can extract with the threat of injunction, which is given by 2 .
This assumption can be justi…ed if we consider a situation in which the court has information about the market value of the end product produced by the implementer, but is uncertain about the SEP patent's ex ante contribution to the product. In other words, the uncertainty lies in "apportionment" of the value of the SEP. From the perspective of the SEP owner and a downstream implementer, this implies that the court-determined FRAND rate can be modeled as a random variable e r 2 [0; 2 ] with a distribution function F (:). I assume that the court's assessment is unbiased in that the expected value of e r is equal to the ex ante benchmark rate , i.e.,
E(e r) = In addition, r > :
Proof. The licensee's objective is to minimize the expected licensee fee. If the licensee accept the contract with a royalty rate of r, its licensee fee is simply r, the LHS of the equation above. The RHS of the equation represents the expected licensee payment when the licensee rejects the o¤er. If the court deems that the o¤ered royalty rate r exceeds the court-determined FRAND rate e r, the court will impose e r. However, if the court determines that the licensor o¤ered a FRAND rate (i.e., r o e r), the SEP owner has ful…lled his FRAND obligation and is entitled to injunctive relief. This event takes place with a probability of In addition, '(r = 0) = 2 < 0 and '(r = 2 ) = 2 > 0. Taken together, there is a unique r such that '(r) = 0: Moreover, '(r = ) < 0 because
e rdF (e r) = : Therefore, r > :
The optimal contract o¤ ered by the SEP owner has a licensing fee of r = r with r > , which is accepted by the licensee.
Proof. Given Lemma 1, we know that any contract o¤er with r > r will be rejected by the licensee and the court will determine if r is FRAND or not. In this case, the expected licensing fee for the SEP owner is [
;which is decreasing in r and thus maximized at r = r for r 2 [r; 1): In contrast, any contract o¤er with r < r will be accepted. Thus, the best contract to be accepted is r = r: See Figure 2 .
This analysis reveals that the court rule assumed in this paper induces a royalty fee that is excessive from an economic viewpoint. In other words, the threat of injunction overcompensates the SEP owner even if it is encumbered by the FRAND commitment.
The reason is that the court's estimation of the FRAND rate is inherently imprecise; there is a chance that the court may deem an initial o¤er by the SEP-owner to be FRAND and grant injunctive relief, even if the initial o¤er exceeds .
The next proposition characterizes the optimal expected licensing fee in case the initial o¤er is rejected by the licensee, but deemed to satisfy FRAND by the court. This leads one to seek a mechanism that would induce the equilibrium royalty rate that would be negotiated to be the true value of innovation . Proof. By using the logic of the proof for Proposition 1, the equilibrium r = if the following condition holds.
Solving the equation above in terms of yields the desired result.
Proposition 2 implies that the negotiated royalty rate under an injunction threat exceeds : However, a mechanism that induces such an expected licensing fee derived above would be di¢ cult to implement. The next section proposes an alternative scheme to induce the ex ante value of innovation as the equilibrium licensing fee in the initial negotiation.
Injunction with a Leniency Zone
I propose the following modi…ed mechanism. This mechanism speci…es a leniency range in which injunction can be avoided even if the rejected royalty rate satis…es the FRAND commitment. More speci…cally, injunction is allowed only in the case where the licensee is thought to be unreasonably incalcitrant in refusing the SEP owner's o¤er. To formalize this, let r be the SEP owner's o¤er, and the court's estimation of the FRAND rate to be e r(> r). As a result, the SEP owner has o¤ered a low enough royalty rate that satis…es the FRAND obligation. However, injunction is allowed only when the di¤erence (e r r) exceeds a threshold value . If not, the court enforces the initial contract o¤ered by the SEP owner r. We can interpret as a parameter that represents the extent of a leniency zone. With this modi…ed court rule, the expected royalty payment when an initial contract of r is rejected is given by:
Once again, the optimal royalty rate r o¤ered by the SEP owner and accepted by the licensee satis…es the relationship r = e (r ; ): Let r ( ) be the solution. We would like to have the policy instrument to induce r ( ) = : More speci…cally, we want to be chosen to satisfy = e ( ; ), that is,
Proposition 3 There is a unique that is implicitly de…ned by = e ( ; ):
Proof. It can be easily veri…ed that e ( ; ) is decreasing in because
In addition, we know that < e ( ; = 0) whereas lim Proof. By totally di¤erentiating = e ( ; ) with respect to and ; we have
@e ( Single-Crossing-at-the Mean Condition (SCM). The distribution function of e r corresponding to two di¤ erent levels of imprecision and 0 , with 0 > , intersect only once at the mean, that is, F (e r; ) F (e r; 0 ) R 0, according to e r R E(e r) = . 22 This implies that the court should be more conservative in issuing an injunction as a remedy for the SEP-owner when the court is less able to precisely assess the appropriate FRAND rate.
Concluding Remarks
Recent years have witnessed a dramatic increase in the number of disputes that involve standard essential patents. There has been a serious concern that SEP owners' ability to enjoin alleged infringers from selling infringing products creates an ex post hold-up whether the SEP owner's contract o¤er is FRAND and an injunctive relief is o¤ered only when the initial o¤er is indeed deemed to be FRAND. I show that the SEP-holder's ability to hold-up is limited by the prospect of the court-imposed licensing terms, but is not completely eliminated. I discuss possible mechanisms to address the residual hold-up power of SEP-holders. In particular, injunctive relief with a suitable leniency zone restores the balance of power and induces the ex ante value of the SEP as the equilibrium royalty rate that would be negotiated by the SEP owner and the implementer. As policy implications, the analysis suggests that the court should be more conservative in granting injunctive relief for the SEP-owner when the innovation is incremental and the court is less con…dent in its ability to precisely assess the FRAND rate.
